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Redak 1: Redak 1:
<b>A state of gloom</b><br><font color="#999999" face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-2">Jan 18th
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______________________________________________________________Slika 1. Koncentrirajuća solarna termalna elektrana
2001<br>From The Economist print edition</font><br><br><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1"><b>One of the wealthiest regions
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[[Image:STE-1.jpeg|thumb|right|600px]]
in the world is on the brink of an energy crisis of third-world dimensions. How
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'''Solarne termalne elektrane''' su izvori električne struje dobivene pretvorbom Sunčeve energije u toplinsku (za razliku od fotovoltaika kod kojih se električna energija dobiva direktno). S obzirom da nemaju štetnih produkata prilikom proizvodnje električne energije, a imaju razmjernu dobru efikasnost (20-40%), proriče im se svjetla budućnost.
did California come to this?</b></font><br><br clear="all">
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Kako je količina energija koja pada na površinu izuzetno velika, izgradnjom takvih elektrana na sunčanim područjima (npr. Sahara) mogao bi se energijom snabdijevati veliki dio potrošača, barem dok ne uzmemo ekonomiju u obzir. Ipak, čak i na manjoj skali mogu postati vrlo bitan faktor (npr. na otocima).  
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Zbog potrebe za visokim temperaturama, gotovo svi oblici solarnih termalnih elektrana moraju koristiti nekakav oblik koncentriranja Sunčevih zraka s velikog prostora na malu površinu.  
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Kako se tokom dana položaj Sunca na nebu mijenja, tako se stalno mijenja i najpovoljniji kut pod kojim padaju Sunčeve zrake na zrcala, stoga je potrebno ugraditi sustave koji će stalno prilagođavati njihov položaj. Ti sustavi su neophodni kako bi se dobila što veća efikasnost, ali ujedno i najveći čimbenik u vrlo visokim cijenama solarnih termalnih elektrana.  
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Smanjenja u cijeni su moguća skladištenjem topline, a ne struje, budući da je takva tehnologija danas jeftinija, a proizvodnja topline je ionako neophodna za funkcioniranje ovakvog tipa elektrana. Time je moguće također dobivati električnu energiju i onda kada to inače ne bi bilo moguće (za vrijeme smanjene insulacije - mjera energije solarne radijacije primljene ili predane  od strane određene površine u određenom vremenu).  
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Danas se koriste jedino koncentrirajuće solarne termalne elektrane (CSP – Concentrated Solar Plant). Sastoje se od zrcala i spremnika fluida koji se zagrijava te takav prolazi kroz turbine ili toplinske motore (npr. Strilnigov motor). S obzirom na raznolikosti među zrcalima i cjelokupnoj izvedbi sustava možemo ih podijeliti u sljedeće kategorije:
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===='''Parabolični kolektori'''====
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[[Image:STE-2.jpeg|thumb|right|800px|Slika 2. Parablolični kolektori]]
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|}<p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">ON JANUARY 16th, the
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Sastoje se od dugih nizova paraboličnih zrcala (zakrivljenih oko samo jedne osi) i kolektora koji se nalazi iznad njih. Njihova je prednost što je potrebno pomicanje zrcala samo kada je promjena položaja Sunca u ortogonalnom smjeru, dok prilikom paralelnog pomaka to nije potrebno jer svjetlost i dalje pada na kolektore. Kroz kolektore struje sintetičko ulje, rastopljena sol ili para pod tlakom koji se pod utjecajem Sunčevih zraka zagrijavaju. Te je kolektore moguće izvesti u vakumiranom staklu tako da se spriječe gubici topline kondukcijom i konvekcijom, a postižu efikasnost od 20%.
Californian state assembly passed a bill giving the state a central role in the
 
local electricity market. This, in effect, turned the clock back on the
 
deregulation of California’s power industry begun in 1996 amid grand promises of
 
reduced rates for consumers, more secure supplies for business, and bigger
 
markets for power companies. But in fact the state had few options. On the same
 
day, two of California’s largest utilities had their debts reduced to junk by
 
the leading credit agencies after one of them, Southern California Edison (<font size="-1">SCE</font>), announced that it would not be paying $596m due to
 
creditors, in order to “preserve cash”. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">That undermined the
 
ability of <font size="-1">SCE</font> and of Pacific Gas &amp; Electric (<font size="-1">PG&amp;E</font>), the other big utility in the state, to buy power on
 
credit, and pushed them to the brink of bankruptcy. On the same day, a “stage 3”
 
emergency was declared, the highest level of alert, called only when power
 
reserves fall below 1.5% of demand. On January 17th, one-hour black-outs rolled
 
round the area of northern California served by <font size="-1">PG&amp;E</font>.
 
And Governor Gray Davis declared a state of emergency, authorising the state
 
water department to buy power.</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">This is a dreadful mess
 
for a state that is held up around the world as a model of innovation and
 
dynamic markets, and that was the first in America to pursue deregulation. What
 
on earth has gone wrong? </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">The short answer is,
 
botched deregulation. The peculiarly bad way in which California’s deregulation
 
was organised freed prices for wholesale electricity while putting a freeze on
 
retail rates. As a result, the state’s utilities have been forced to buy power
 
on the red-hot spot market (where prices have soared recently—see chart 1) for
 
far more than they are able to recoup from consumers. </font></p>
 
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|}<p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Catastrophe has been
 
looming for some time now. The state’s residents have already endured a series
 
of annoying and expensive “brown-outs”. Indeed, power emergencies have become so
 
common that they are announced along with the traffic and weather reports on the
 
morning news. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Only recently, however,
 
have local politicians begun to take action. Earlier this month, the state’s
 
legislature approved a temporary rate increase to ease the pain for the
 
utilities. Mindful of the state’s noisy consumer lobbies, legislators approved a
 
hike of only about 10%, and then only for three months. And even that is subject
 
to reversal. It came nowhere near the 30% hike that the utilities claim they
 
need to survive. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Mr Davis, the state
 
governor, tried to bully his way out of the crisis during his “state of the
 
state” speech on January 8th. “Never again can we allow out-of-state profiteers
 
to hold Californians hostage,” he declared, threatening to seize electricity
 
assets and run them himself if necessary. Needless to say, his speech did not
 
help much. Curtis Hebert, a Republican commissioner on the Federal Energy
 
Regulatory Commission (<font size="-1">FERC</font>), the country’s top electricity
 
regulator, fumed: “You’ve got a governor who cares more about being on a
 
night-time news show than he does about fixing the problem in
 
California.”</font></p><font face="verdana, geneva, arial, sans serif"><b>British fog</b></font><br><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">If California fails to
 
tackle its power problems swiftly, the knock-on effects could be severe. Morgan
 
Stanley Dean Witter, an investment bank, has just warned that “California’s
 
crisis could magnify the downside for the whole economy. In the end, the state’s
 
energy crisis could prove to be an unwanted wild card for the American financial
 
markets and the global economy at large.” </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Such fears of contagion
 
explain why the outgoing Clinton administration has been scrambling to organise
 
a series of summits between state and federal officials, the utilities, and
 
their main power suppliers. The legislation passed this week, if it ever becomes
 
law, would allow California’s creditworthy Department of Water Resources to buy
 
additional power directly under long-term contracts and to sell it on to the
 
utilities at a fraction of the current spot-market price. But, inevitably, this
 
can serve only as a stop-gap measure; the talks brokered by federal officials,  
 
aimed at providing the foundation for a longer-term solution, are due to resume
 
on January 23rd. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">To see how California
 
might move forward, look first at how it got itself into such a pickle. Largely
 
inspired by Britain’s success in opening up its power sector a decade ago,
 
California led the United States into the brave new world of liberalised
 
electricity markets. After years of haggling among various interest groups—from
 
the big utilities to greens and consumer organisations—the administration of Mr
 
Davis’s predecessor, Pete Wilson, put together a compromise deregulation bill
 
with enough bells and whistles to please almost every interest group.
 
</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Through the whole
 
process, Britain’s power deregulation was the inspiration. Stephen Baum, the
 
boss of Sempra (which owns San Diego Gas &amp; Electric, a utility that is in
 
better financial shape than <font size="-1">PG&amp;E </font>and <font size="-1">SCE</font>), says that “California embraced competition as a religion
 
and the English model as our guide.” However, California’s zealous reformers
 
forged ahead without taking into account some important differences between
 
California and Britain—for example, in areas such as reserve capacity. In
 
Europe, deregulation has not resulted in reliability problems. But credit for
 
that belongs not to European models of reform, but rather to excess capacity.
 
Europe’s top-heavy, state-dominated power sector has tended to “gold-plate” its
 
assets (through higher tariffs paid by captive customers). California was not in
 
such a happy position.</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Another difference
 
between the two models is that Californian officials let pork-barrel politics
 
inhibit the development of the retail market. Rather than allowing prices to
 
fluctuate, politicians decided to freeze electricity rates for a few
 
years—supposedly in the interests of the consumer. But that gave consumers no
 
reason to cut power use even when wholesale prices sky-rocketed—as they have
 
done recently. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Also, under pressure
 
from the big and politically powerful utilities, the state’s politicians agreed
 
to compensate the companies generously for “stranded assets”—such as the big
 
power plants built before deregulation suddenly changed the rules of the game.
 
That sounds fair enough, but California agreed to value those assets much more
 
generously than other states. Worse still, officials decided to burden new
 
entrants to the business with part of the cost of the “stranded assets” built by
 
the incumbents. Hence newcomers have been severely handicapped in their ability
 
to compete on price. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">A number of other states
 
largely avoided making these mistakes. In Texas, for instance, firms are free to
 
enter into long-term contracts in order to hedge against the risk of volatile
 
prices. And Pennsylvania has had great success in spurring competition from
 
newcomers. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">California allowed none
 
of this, and the upshot is that hardly any Californians have switched retail
 
suppliers, unlike Pennsylvanians. In Britain, one-quarter of the public has
 
switched. What California dubbed “deregulation” did very little to unshackle the
 
power sector from the state. </font></p><font face="verdana, geneva, arial, sans serif"><b>Supply, demand and
 
politics</b></font><br><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Yet even with its
 
half-baked, half-British model, the state might have muddled along for quite
 
some time. The snag is that a bunch of uniquely Californian forces conspired to
 
bring things to a head: fierce opposition to new power supply; a dramatic surge
 
in demand; and, in particular, the politics of pork and populism. </font></p>
 
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|}<p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">For a start, the state’s
 
supply picture has grown ever bleaker. New power plants are rarely popular in
 
any part of the world, but in California the famous “not in my back yard” (<font size="-1">NIMBY</font>) syndrome has reached ridiculous levels, thanks to the
 
state’s hyper-democratic balloting process. The state has also long had the
 
toughest environmental laws in America, and these have helped to make power
 
generation unattractive. Thanks to greenery gone mad, neighbourhoods turned
 
selfish and surly, and red tape and regulatory uncertainty run amok, the state’s
 
utilities have not built a new power-generation plant in over a decade.  
 
</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Yet the state’s appetite
 
for electricity has shot through the roof. Defying official forecasts made early
 
in the decade, California’s power consumption grew by a quarter during the 1990s
 
(see chart 2). The most dramatic factor fuelling the growth in demand has been
 
the digital revolution, spawned in northern California. As computing power has
 
spread to everything from the manufacture of microchips to the frothing of
 
cappuccinos, California has defied eco-pundits and state officials who forecast
 
that the Internet and the “new economy” would inevitably lead to less
 
consumption of electricity. In San Jose, the heart of Silicon Valley,
 
consumption has been growing at about 8% a year. </font></p>
 
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|}<br><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">The clincher, though,
 
has been the peculiar politics of California. Politicians and regulators have
 
been fiddling with the reform process in ways that are both capricious and
 
counterproductive. Amazed that the free market for wholesale power responded to
 
last summer’s supply squeeze by raising prices, panicky officials ordered “caps”
 
on those prices. Predictably, the caps have failed miserably—as the more recent
 
supply crunch amply demonstrates. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Power prices shot up
 
because supply was scarce, and the right solution would have been to let markets
 
respond—as mid-western states did when they suffered similar price hikes a few
 
summers ago. They did not meddle in the wholesale markets, and generators
 
responded to the price signals by rushing to add supply. Notably, the crises
 
there have not recurred.</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">The most disturbing
 
failure in California, however, lies with the regulators themselves. Sometimes
 
they trust not at all in market forces: for example, they actually discouraged
 
utilities from hedging their price risks by purchasing derivatives. This lunacy
 
as much as anything explains why the state’s utilities are now on the verge of
 
insolvency, compelled to buy power on the spot market. </font></p>
 
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|  align="left" | <font face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="-1"><b>That solution’s a long way
 
off</b></font></tbody>
 
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|}<p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Yet at other times, the
 
regulators naively expect the market to sort out the problems of transition by
 
itself. When Britain deregulated, for example, its pricing mechanism offered
 
power suppliers an explicit top-up to encourage them to create reserve capacity.
 
Though California deregulated into a much tighter market, its regulators offered
 
no such incentive, relying entirely on the market to secure adequate supplies.
 
This schizophrenia explains why the Californian reforms are a ragbag of muddled
 
half-measures and downright anti-competitive clauses.</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Given the imminent
 
collapse of the state’s utilities, there is much agitation from all quarters for
 
the state or federal government to do something. But what? James Hoecker, the
 
current head of <font size="-1">FERC</font>, says that “California’s market is
 
clearly flawed by design...it will be very difficult to reform, but reform it we
 
must, and reform it we can.” </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">The Clinton
 
administration might have offered some help: Bill Richardson, the departing
 
energy secretary, has long advocated regional price caps. Mr Hoecker saw those
 
caps as too hard to implement, but he too sought a regional solution on the
 
grounds that the Californian crisis is really “an enormous struggle between
 
sellers of power, mostly in the interior states, and the buyers of power, mostly
 
on the coast.” But both Mr Richardson and Mr Hoecker are leaving office this
 
weekend, and the men chosen by George Bush to replace them will be likely to
 
oppose anything that calls for heavy-handed federal involvement. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">One option for those
 
looking for a way to bring the state out of this mess is to let the utilities go
 
bankrupt. Some market-minded folk argue this case, pointing out that companies
 
in all sorts of industries go bust all the time. Setting aside politics, why not
 
power too? Surely the lights can be kept on, argue such voices, by the
 
bankruptcy court, the state or, ultimately, by the new managers of those
 
assets?</font></p>
 
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|  align="left" | <font face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="-1"><b>Get a grip, Governor
 
Davis</b></font></tbody>
 
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|}<p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">This is a tempting
 
argument, but the reason why bankruptcy is not a solution, argues Tom Higgins of
 
Edison International, the parent of <font size="-1">SCE</font>, is that “this
 
situation is directly the result of government action and inaction; it is not
 
due to management failure.” Any new manager of the utilities’ assets would find
 
it impossible to run them under the perverse conditions mandated by California’s
 
current regulatory regime. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Another option is for
 
the state to give in to the popular backlash and to re-regulate the power
 
business. That is not such a remote possibility. Carl Wood of the Public
 
Utilities Commission, California’s top electricity regulator, wants not only to
 
re-regulate, but to go further and introduce a big state presence in power. Mr
 
Wood says: “I’m not an economist, so I’m flying by the seat of my pants, but it
 
seems to me that it is orthodox economics that got us into this mess in the
 
first place.” Mr Davis also hinted at a reversal in his recent speech, with its
 
sinister threats of expropriation and criminal action. While such a move cannot
 
be ruled out, it would be sheer folly to let the state’s incompetent, bungling
 
politicians and regulators run the power utilities as a reward for having run
 
them into the ground in the first place. </font></p><font face="verdana, geneva, arial, sans serif"><b>What next?</b></font><br><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">The sensible way forward
 
is to see any state intervention as a short-term fix that merely buys time to
 
sort out the regulatory mess, and so propels the state towards a market-based
 
long-term solution. Any short-term fix, which must surface soon in view of the
 
parlous state of the utilities’ finances, needs to deal with three separate
 
aspects of the current liquidity crunch: paying for yesterday’s power; paying
 
for today’s power; and paying for tomorrow’s power.</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Yesterday’s power led to
 
the $12 billion or so in debts now owed by the utilities to banks, power
 
producers and other creditors. Any deal will probably include an agreement to
 
allow delayed repayment in return for some sort of guarantee, implicit or
 
explicit, from the state that the creditors will indeed get their money some
 
day. This week’s legislation suggests that today’s power will probably be
 
purchased by the state. As for tomorrow’s power, even the state cannot afford to
 
pay spot prices for long. So some sort of long-term contracts offering prices
 
closer to historical norms are inevitable. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Having bought a few
 
months’ respite, which may not last beyond this summer’s peak demand,
 
Californian officials must restructure the electricity system to put it on a
 
sounder footing. Mr Baum of Sempra says they must focus on the following: “What
 
will reduce the demand for power? What will increase power supplies? Unless the
 
basic laws of supply and demand are repealed, those two questions must be
 
answered. Everything else is just a sideshow. ”</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">California needs to
 
reform its laws in order to encourage power generation. This will mean, for
 
example, ensuring that environmental regulations are not needlessly prohibitive.
 
It must also involve paring back red tape. This may not be easy, but surely
 
there is no justification for power-plant approvals taking twice as long in
 
California as elsewhere in America (including places that have similar concerns
 
about air quality). </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">Officials must also find
 
ways to get around the <font size="-1">NIMBY</font> problem. One possibility may
 
be a suggestion by Mr Davis that the state withhold funds from localities that
 
are particularly obstructive, in the way that the federal government withholds
 
highway funds from wayward states. An even better solution would be to remove
 
barriers to entry for distributed generation, and to ensure that the established
 
incumbents do not obstruct new micropower plants. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">As important as boosting
 
generation is fixing the consumer market. In the long run, liberalisation and
 
competition will deliver lower electricity prices for companies and households
 
alike. But there is a case for protecting domestic households from price
 
volatility until a genuinely competitive retail market emerges. Unless consumers
 
see fluctuations in prices, however, especially at peak times, they will have no
 
incentive to save power or to shift their use off-peak. This leads to an obscene
 
waste of energy.</font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">To allow retail prices
 
to fluctuate with market conditions requires the installation of sophisticated
 
meters for all the state’s consumers. Crucially, proper metering will speed the
 
arrival of such innovations as fixed-price “energy service” contracts, which
 
promise outcomes such as certain levels of heating, rather than the mere
 
delivery of kilowatts. Price transparency will also allow micropower plants to
 
sell and buy power on the grid as demand dictates, so improving the grid’s
 
reliability. </font></p><p><font face="verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif" size="-1">If California’s
 
politicians see today’s crisis as a chance to fix this deregulation gone awry,
 
then the future may be bright for the state’s suffering citizens. Muddling along
 
and hoping for manna from heaven is no longer an option. The state’s
 
irresponsible politicians have one last chance to fix the mess that they have
 
created. If they do not, then at best it will be a sweltering summer for
 
Californians this year.</font></p><br clear="all"><br clear="all">
 
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|-
 
|  align="center" | <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="-2">Copyright © 1995-2001 The Economist Newspaper Group Ltd. All
 
rights reserved. </font><br>
 
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Trenutačna izmjena od 18:05, 22. siječnja 2008.

______________________________________________________________Slika 1. Koncentrirajuća solarna termalna elektrana

STE-1.jpeg

Solarne termalne elektrane su izvori električne struje dobivene pretvorbom Sunčeve energije u toplinsku (za razliku od fotovoltaika kod kojih se električna energija dobiva direktno). S obzirom da nemaju štetnih produkata prilikom proizvodnje električne energije, a imaju razmjernu dobru efikasnost (20-40%), proriče im se svjetla budućnost. Kako je količina energija koja pada na površinu izuzetno velika, izgradnjom takvih elektrana na sunčanim područjima (npr. Sahara) mogao bi se energijom snabdijevati veliki dio potrošača, barem dok ne uzmemo ekonomiju u obzir. Ipak, čak i na manjoj skali mogu postati vrlo bitan faktor (npr. na otocima).

Zbog potrebe za visokim temperaturama, gotovo svi oblici solarnih termalnih elektrana moraju koristiti nekakav oblik koncentriranja Sunčevih zraka s velikog prostora na malu površinu. Kako se tokom dana položaj Sunca na nebu mijenja, tako se stalno mijenja i najpovoljniji kut pod kojim padaju Sunčeve zrake na zrcala, stoga je potrebno ugraditi sustave koji će stalno prilagođavati njihov položaj. Ti sustavi su neophodni kako bi se dobila što veća efikasnost, ali ujedno i najveći čimbenik u vrlo visokim cijenama solarnih termalnih elektrana.

Smanjenja u cijeni su moguća skladištenjem topline, a ne struje, budući da je takva tehnologija danas jeftinija, a proizvodnja topline je ionako neophodna za funkcioniranje ovakvog tipa elektrana. Time je moguće također dobivati električnu energiju i onda kada to inače ne bi bilo moguće (za vrijeme smanjene insulacije - mjera energije solarne radijacije primljene ili predane od strane određene površine u određenom vremenu).

Danas se koriste jedino koncentrirajuće solarne termalne elektrane (CSP – Concentrated Solar Plant). Sastoje se od zrcala i spremnika fluida koji se zagrijava te takav prolazi kroz turbine ili toplinske motore (npr. Strilnigov motor). S obzirom na raznolikosti među zrcalima i cjelokupnoj izvedbi sustava možemo ih podijeliti u sljedeće kategorije:


Parabolični kolektori

Slika 2. Parablolični kolektori

Sastoje se od dugih nizova paraboličnih zrcala (zakrivljenih oko samo jedne osi) i kolektora koji se nalazi iznad njih. Njihova je prednost što je potrebno pomicanje zrcala samo kada je promjena položaja Sunca u ortogonalnom smjeru, dok prilikom paralelnog pomaka to nije potrebno jer svjetlost i dalje pada na kolektore. Kroz kolektore struje sintetičko ulje, rastopljena sol ili para pod tlakom koji se pod utjecajem Sunčevih zraka zagrijavaju. Te je kolektore moguće izvesti u vakumiranom staklu tako da se spriječe gubici topline kondukcijom i konvekcijom, a postižu efikasnost od 20%.